Creative Freedom

Download our Appeal Brief below and join our fight to have creative freedom in artistic publishing.

Support the Fight for Creative Freedom

The court’s refusal to register US SPACE FORCE—a mark filed before the military branch even existed—sets a dangerous precedent. It threatens the rights of content creators, entrepreneurs, and anyone who relies on trademarks to build a future. I am taking this battle to the U.S. Supreme Court because the law must protect innovation, not punish it. On this page, you’ll find the court filings, a detailed analysis, a draft amicus brief you can use or share, and a short video—“US SPACE FORCE: A Battle for Creative Freedom”—that explains why this case matters to all of us. Stand with me. Share the video. File an amicus brief with the Supreme Court. Help defend creative rights before they’re erased by vague laws and shifting government policies.

Join us in our fight for “Creative Freedom” by using our submission form, to contact us about the appeal case and how you can help.

Thank you for your support.
— Thomas D. Foster

Analysis of the case

From a review of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re: Thomas D. Foster, APC, several inconsistencies and potential flaws in the Court’s reasoning become apparent. These raise substantial constitutional and legal concerns, particularly regarding due process, fair notice, and the predictability of trademark law.

 

1. Retroactive Evidence Undermines Constructive Use Principle
Inconsistency:
The Court allowed evidence developed after the March 19, 2018 trademark application to be used to assess whether the mark US SPACE FORCE falsely suggested a connection to the U.S. government.

 

Why this is problematic:
  • The Lanham Act gives an intent-to-use (ITU) applicant a constructive use date as of the filing date (15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)), meaning the applicant is entitled to priority based on that date.
  • Yet here, the Court allowed the USPTO to use later-occurring government actions—including the June 2018 directive and December 2019 legislation—to retroactively deny Foster’s rights.
  • This creates a Catch-22: if events that happen after you file can undermine your rights, the constructive use doctrine is meaningless.
2. Vagueness in What Constitutes a “False Suggestion of a Connection”
Inconsistency:
The Court upheld the refusal under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act by finding a “false suggestion of a connection” with the United States, even though the U.S. Space Force did not exist at the time of filing.

 

Why this is problematic:
  • The identity that Foster supposedly falsely connected to—a military branch called U.S. Space Force—was not yet formed or legally recognized.
  • The opinion claims that the U.S. government or its “instrumentalities” were broadly suggested by the mark, but this is unmoored from any specific, pre-existing institution.
  • The Court’s willingness to treat a speculative idea publicly floated by the President as an institutional identity creates a dangerous vagueness that chills speech and creative business ventures.
3. Confusing and Shifting Target of the Alleged “Connection”
Inconsistency:
The opinion shifts between saying the mark falsely suggests a connection to:
  • The U.S. Space Force
  • The U.S. Government
  • The military
  • President Trump
Why this is problematic:
  • The Court says it doesn’t matter which one, because all are “instrumentalities of the U.S.” But false suggestion claims under § 2(a) require a mark to point “uniquely and unmistakably” to a specific person or institution.
  • This dilution of the standard means any general patriotic or governmental reference could be subjectively refused—without clear limits.
4. Conflict with Piano Factory Precedent on Timing
Inconsistency:
The Court tries to distinguish Piano Factory Group v. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH by arguing that it only applies to cancellations, not refusals to register.

 

Why this is problematic:
  • The Piano Factory reasoning is based on due process principles: registrability should be judged at a defined moment, not adjusted as facts evolve.
  • Allowing shifting facts during the USPTO examination phase introduces legal unpredictability—and contradicts how § 2 is applied elsewhere (e.g., likelihood of confusion under § 2(d)).
5. Potential Constitutional Due Process Violation
Legal Risk:
  • The vague application of § 2(a) and reliance on post-filing facts mean Foster could not have known at the time of filing that his mark would be refused.
  • That lack of fair notice may violate due process under the Fifth Amendment, as laws and government actions must give clear guidance on what is prohibited.
Conclusion:
The Court’s reasoning opens the door to retroactive trademark refusals based on evolving political decisions. It blurs the line between creative expression and governmental exclusivity, all while disregarding the core principles of constructive use, clear statutory standards, and timing certainty. These inconsistencies justify Foster’s appeal to the Supreme Court—not just to vindicate his application, but to clarify how far § 2(a) can reach before it becomes unconstitutional.
Curated Articles

TD Foster Appeal Brief

Curated Articles

US Court of Appeals

Curated Articles

US Court of Appeals
Federal Circuit – Part A

Curated Articles

US Court of Appeals
Federal Circuit – Part B

Curated Articles

US Department of Justice

Curated Articles

Supreme Court
of the United States